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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a story, certainly apocryphal, about a kicker on a profes-
sional football team who is playing in an important game.  After a
drive by his team stalls, the kicker runs out on the field to attempt a
field goal and promptly misses it by twenty yards to the left.  Later in
the same game, the kicker is called upon to attempt another field goal
and misses it by twenty yards to the right.  The head coach, incensed
by such incompetence, runs over to the kicker on the sideline to yell
at him for kicking so poorly.  When the coach begins his tirade, how-
ever, the kicker turns to him and, not missing a beat, says, “What do
you mean coach?  On average, I’m kicking them right down the mid-
dle.”  The lesson of the story is that statistics, even when mathemati-
cally correct, do not necessarily provide meaningful or practical
insight into the problem studied.
In an Article recently published in the pages of this Law Review,1
Professor Steven B. Lichtman catalogues the cases of the Supreme
Court of the United States since World War I in which the United
States military was a litigant, and draws several conclusions from his
Copyright  2007 by John F. O’Connor.
* Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP.  B.A., University of Rochester; M.S.Sc., Syracuse
University; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law.  The author served as an officer in
the United States Marine Corps from 1988 to 1998, and served as a judge advocate from
1995 to 1998.  The views expressed herein are those of the author only, and are not neces-
sarily the views of Steptoe & Johnson LLP.  The author would like to thank Jonathan Flynn
and John Cummings for their helpful comments on the arguments addressed in this
Article.
1. Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Tradition of Deference to the Military, 1918–2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907 (2006).
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review about the scope and nature of the Supreme Court’s tradition
of deferring to military (and political branch) judgments about mili-
tary matters.  Of particular import, Professor Lichtman submits that
while most scholars have analyzed the military deference doctrine by
tracing its development over time, broad conclusions can be drawn
about the doctrine by analyzing the Supreme Court’s “military”2 deci-
sions by subject matter, irrespective of the time period of the deci-
sions.3  Professor Lichtman’s analysis is primarily statistical in method,
in that most of his conclusions stem from his calculations of the mili-
tary rate of success in litigating various types of cases before the Su-
preme Court.4
Beyond his conclusion that the military deference doctrine may
be analyzed productively by subject matter instead of by date of deci-
sion, Professor Lichtman makes a number of observations that are at
least mildly provocative.  For example, Professor Lichtman concludes
from his analysis of the data that, contrary to the views of many com-
mentators, “the deference tradition has distant roots and that if any-
thing, the Court was much more deferential to the military before the
Vietnam War” than it is today.5  Indeed, Professor Lichtman offers the
view that the Court’s tradition of military deference has been a stable
body of jurisprudence, one that has undergone only a “subtle evolu-
tion” over the many decades in which it has been applied.6  Perhaps
most significant, Professor Lichtman concludes from the data that
“the Supreme Court’s tradition of deference to the military does not
extend—and, logically, should not extend—to cases involving nonmili-
tary persons.”7
2. This Article often uses quotation marks in discussing the terms “military” cases and
“civilian” cases.  These quotation marks reflect Professor Lichtman’s treatment of any case
in which the military effectively is a litigant as a “military” case, and cases in which the
military is not a litigant as “civilian” cases.  In this author’s view, such a distinction is of little
value in analyzing the military deference doctrine because the doctrine properly applies
only to a  small subset of cases that would fall into the category of “military” cases as that
term is used by Professor Lichtman.
3. See Lichtman, supra note 1, at 910–11 (“Prominent accounts of the Supreme R
Court’s tradition of deference to the military have analyzed the phenomenon in exclusively
chronological fashion.  Although political development approaches to understanding legal
phenomena are usually preferable (especially vis-a`-vis the modification of doctrine), this
Article utilizes a subject-specific approach.” (footnote omitted)).
4. See id. at 910 (“The tandem goals of this Article are to systematically examine just
how successful the military has been before the Supreme Court and to extract from the
cases the jurisprudential and philosophical explanations for that success.”).
5. Id. at 945.
6. Id. at 915.
7. Id. at 940.
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Professor Lichtman’s article is a useful contribution to the ex-
isting literature on the military deference doctrine because it chal-
lenges a number of orthodoxies concerning the doctrine, such as the
best way to group cases for analysis, as well as the origins and scope of
the doctrine itself.  Nevertheless, as someone who has studied and
written about the military deference doctrine in some detail,8 I have
given considerable thought to Professor Lichtman’s arguments and,
upon deliberation, remain unconvinced as to several of the central
theses of Professor Lichtman’s analysis.  Most of my criticisms of Pro-
fessor Lichtman’s analysis stem from his overly generalized approach
to the military deference doctrine, one that tries to draw conclusions
about the doctrine from statistics, instead of by reading and analyzing
what the cases actually say.  Indeed, by conducting his analysis solely
by keeping track of “wins” and “losses,” without delving into the ana-
lytical underpinnings of the Court’s military deference jurisprudence,
Professor Lichtman conducts his analysis from the wrong pool of cases
and, consequently, arrives at substantive conclusions that are not justi-
fied by the existing case law.
As Part II of this Article explains, Professor Lichtman’s analysis is
flawed in that he begins with the faulty assumption that the military
deference doctrine is best analyzed by taking into account the Su-
preme Court’s decisions in the entire universe of “military” decisions,
that is, every decision before the Court in which the military was a
litigant.  A review of the cases actually applying the military deference
framework, however, makes clear that the rationale behind the doc-
trine will only support its application in a narrow category of “military”
cases—cases where a challenge to statutes or regulations relating to
the military require the Court, as part of its analysis, to weigh the gov-
ernment interest in the challenged statute or regulation.  By begin-
ning with a pool of cases that is over-inclusive in the extreme,
Professor Lichtman is essentially attempting to draw conclusions
about the military deference doctrine from the results in a universe of
cases, the vast majority of which would never trigger deferential
review.
Part III of this Article takes issue with Professor Lichtman’s no-
tion that it is at all useful to utilize subject matter, irrespective of the
date of decision, as an organizing principle for analyzing the Court’s
application of the military deference doctrine.  Professor Lichtman’s
thesis that subject matter is an appropriate organizing principle is
8. See generally John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference
Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000).
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heavily dependent on his conclusion that the Court’s tradition of def-
erence to the military has been relatively stable over the years.  This
conclusion, however, is demonstrably incorrect.  A review of the cases
shows a pronounced change in the Court’s treatment of constitutional
challenges in the military context beginning in the mid-1950s and ex-
tending through the 1960s, with the Court’s decisions and its rhetoric
evincing hostility toward the military’s system of justice.  Professor
Lichtman’s analysis essentially ignores this watershed shift in the
Court’s jurisprudential approach to military cases, which in turn skews
the results of his analysis.  Part III also explains how Professor Licht-
man’s conclusion that the military deference doctrine does not ex-
tend to cases involving nonmilitary personnel is not borne out by the
case law.  Even in the mere thirty years in which the Court’s modern
military deference jurisprudence has existed, the Court has utilized
the doctrine in cases involving burdens placed on civilian persons and
entities on multiple occasions.
Finally, Part IV of this Article examines the Court’s likely treat-
ment of the military deference doctrine going forward.  Given that the
extent of the Court’s willingness to defer to political branch judg-
ments about military affairs primarily has been a function of the
Court’s membership at the time in question, and not the product of a
venerable analytical framework for considering such questions, it is
reasonable to consider whether the doctrine is likely to evolve, or even
disappear, in light of recent changes in the Court’s membership.
What little is known about the judicial philosophies of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito suggests that each new Justice is likely to be
sympathetic to the concept that the Court should defer to the political
branches’ judgments on regulation of the military.  That being said,
however, the modern military deference doctrine is very much the
brainchild of Chief Justice Rehnquist, in that he authored virtually
every majority opinion since 1974 in which the Court has applied the
military deference doctrine.  Only time will tell whether the analytical
framework employed by the Court in considering constitutional chal-
lenges to military practices will change now that its creator and princi-
pal proponent is no longer on the Court.
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE REACH OF THE MILITARY DEFERENCE
DOCTRINE
Professor Lichtman begins his analysis by throwing all of the Su-
preme Court’s “military” decisions into a single pot, recording the mil-
itary’s “victory” or “defeat” in each case, and then segregating the
decisions, where appropriate, into subject-matter categories for fur-
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ther analysis.9  The most striking aspect of Professor Lichtman’s analy-
sis, however, is that he attempts to draw conclusions about the Court’s
willingness to defer to the military without examining in any detail the
reasons given by the Court for its deference or the framework in
which that deference occurred.  This process, however, is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the Court’s military deference ju-
risprudence, as the military deference doctrine has no application in
the vast majority of the “military” cases that come before the Court.
As a result, Professor Lichtman’s study attempts to draw predictive
conclusions about the Court’s military deference doctrine by examin-
ing a pool of cases, the vast majority of which have nothing whatsoever
to do with the Court’s deference jurisprudence.
Most importantly, the Court’s military deference doctrine is lim-
ited to a deferential review of political branch judgments of the legiti-
mate needs of the armed forces, but only to the extent that a weighing
of governmental need is relevant to the Court’s analysis.  The military
deference doctrine has no place, and has not been applied by the
Court, in cases that merely apply or construe federal statutes and reg-
ulations governing the military, with no concomitant constitutional
challenge to such statutes or regulations, or even in cases that chal-
lenge the constitutionality of military statutes or regulations where the
government’s interest is not part of the constitutional analysis.
These fundamental limitations on the scope of the Court’s mili-
tary deference jurisprudence are apparent from the analytical con-
struct adopted by the Court in applying the military deference
doctrine.  The Court’s military deference analysis flows from the
Court’s conclusion that “the military is, by necessity, a specialized soci-
ety separate from civilian society.”10  The specialized and separate na-
ture of the military community derives from the military’s unique
constitutional duty “to fight or be ready to fight . . . should the occa-
sion arise.”11  To adequately perform this constitutional duty, “the mil-
itary must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit
de corps.”12  As the Court has explained:
To prepare for and perform its vital role, the military must
insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without coun-
terpart in civilian life.  The laws and traditions governing
that discipline have a long history; but they are founded on
9. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 911–12. R
10. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
11. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
12. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
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unique military exigencies as powerful now as in the past.
Their contemporary vitality repeatedly has been recognized
by Congress.13
Indeed, the Court has noted that the need to foster obedience and
discipline in the ranks compels the conclusion that “[t]he military
need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such
tolerance is required of the civilian state.”14
Having acknowledged the distinct nature and specialized needs
of the military community, the Court’s military deference jurispru-
dence recognizes that constitutional rights appropriately may apply
differently in the military context than in civilian society as a whole.
For example, in Brown v. Glines,15 the Court observed that “[t]he
rights of military men must yield somewhat ‘to meet certain overrid-
ing demands of discipline and duty . . . .’”16  In Parker v. Levy,17 then-
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in a First Amendment case,
offered the classic statement of the different application of constitu-
tional rights in the military context:
While the members of the military are not excluded
from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the
different character of the military community and of the mil-
itary mission requires a different application of those protec-
tions.  The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the
consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may
render permissible within the military that which would be
constitutionally impermissible outside it.18
Since the Court decided Levy, it has reaffirmed the notion that consti-
tutional rights apply differently in the military context in cases involv-
13. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975); see also Brown v. Glines, 444
U.S. 348, 357 (1980) (“Because the right to command and the duty to obey ordinarily must
go unquestioned, this Court long ago recognized that the military must possess substantial
discretion over its internal discipline.”); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38 (1976) (rec-
ognizing “the difference between the diverse civilian community and the much more
tightly regimented military community”); Levy, 417 U.S. at 744 (“An army is not a delibera-
tive body.  It is the executive arm.  Its law is that of obedience.  No question can be left
open as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890))).
14. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
15. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
16. Id. at 354 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Levy, 417 U.S. at 744).
17. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
18. Id. at 758.
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ing due process,19 equal protection,20 and First Amendment21
challenges to federal statutes or regulations governing military affairs.
The means by which the Court allows for a different application
of constitutional rights in the military context is through application
of the military deference doctrine.  The military deference doctrine
requires that courts be particularly reluctant to second-guess the judg-
ments of Congress and the executive branch as to the needs of the
military when assessing constitutional challenges to federal statutes
and regulations touching on the armed forces.  For example, in over-
ruling a prior decision placing due process limits on the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of courts-martial, the Court explained its conception
of deference as follows:
Decisions of this Court . . . have also emphasized that
Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of
balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the
military.  As we recently reiterated, [j]udicial deference . . . is
at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional
authority to raise and support armies and make rules and
regulations for their governance is challenged.22
19. E.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (“[W]e have recognized in
past cases that ‘the tests and limitations [of due process] may differ because of the military
context.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67
(1981))); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (“[W]hether . . . [due] process
embodies a right to counsel depends upon an analysis of the interests of . . . the regime to
which [the individual] is subject.  In making such an analysis, we must give particular defer-
ence to the determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate the land and
naval forces.” (citation omitted)).
20. E.g., Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 67 (“In that area [of military affairs], as any other, Con-
gress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause, but the tests and limita-
tions to be applied may differ because of the military context.” (citations omitted)).
Goldberg involved a gender-based challenge to the Military Selective Service Act under the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 59.
21. E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“These aspects of military
life do not, of course, render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the
First Amendment.  But ‘within the military community there is simply not the same [indi-
vidual] autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community.’” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Levy, 417 U.S. at 751)); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354
(1980) (“[W]hile members of the military services are entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment, ‘the different character of the military community and of the military
mission requires a different application of those protections.’” (quoting Levy, 417 U.S. at
758)); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (“The notion that federal military reserva-
tions, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally served as a place for free public
assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens is thus historically and consti-
tutionally false.”).
22. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) (second and third alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508).  Addi-
tionally, the Weiss Court stated:
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Since 1981, the Court in reviewing its treatment of “military” cases has
observed no less than five times that its deference to the political
branches “is at its apogee” when reviewing challenges to military stat-
utes and regulations.23
The Court has offered two principal rationales for its highly def-
erential review of political branch judgments as to the proper balance
between military needs and constitutional rights.  The first rationale
concerns the Constitution’s explicit commitment to the political
branches of the task of raising and regulating military forces.24  With
respect to federal statutes governing military affairs, the Court has
found deferential review appropriate based on its view that “the Con-
stitution contemplates that Congress has ‘plenary control over rights,
duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establish-
ment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to mil-
itary discipline.’”25  The Court likewise has noted the President’s
special, constitutionally conferred competence in military affairs as
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.26  Similarly, the Court
has found it appropriate to defer in reviewing regulations adopted by
military officials acting as the proxies of those to whom control of the
national defense has been constitutionally committed, as “military au-
thorities have been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches
with carrying out our Nation’s military policy.”27
Having acknowledged the special, constitutionally recognized
competence of Congress, the President, and military officials to assess
the military’s needs, the Court’s second rationale for deferring to the
Our deference extends to rules relating to the rights of servicemembers: “Con-
gress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of
servicemen against the needs of the military. . . . [W]e have adhered to this princi-
ple of deference in a variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional rights
of servicemen were implicated.”
510 U.S. at 177 (alterations in original) (quoting Solorio, 483 U.S. at 447–48).
23. E.g., Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 70; Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508; Solorio, 483 U.S. at 447; Weiss,
510 U.S. at 177; Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 126 S.
Ct. 1297, 1306 (2006).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16.
25. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983)); see
also Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 43 (“In making such an analysis, we must give particular defer-
ence to the determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate the land and
naval forces, that counsel should not be provided in summary courts-martial.” (citation
omitted)).
26. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (upholding Congress’s delega-
tion of rulemaking authority to the President in a military context in part because “it would
be contrary to the respect owed the President as Commander in Chief to hold that he may
not be given wide discretion and authority” (citation omitted)).
27. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507–08.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 9  9-MAY-07 9:53
676 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:668
political branches’ military judgments is its sense that the courts are
“ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any partic-
ular intrusion upon military authority might have.”28  In upholding
the Military Selective Service Act against a gender-based equal protec-
tion challenge, the Court succinctly contrasted the political branches’
competence over military affairs with its own:
Not only is the scope of Congress’ constitutional power
in this area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of
the courts is marked . . . .  “[I]t is difficult to conceive of an
area of governmental activity in which the courts have less
competence.  The complex, subtle, and professional deci-
sions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control
of a military force are essentially professional military judg-
ments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and
Executive Branches.”29
Thus, the Court has justified its deferential review of “military” statutes
and regulations based on the dual notions that the political branches,
by virtue of their constitutional roles in regulating military affairs and
their experience in performing those roles, have particular expertise
in assessing military needs, while the judiciary is far less able to strike
the proper balance between military needs and constitutional rights.
The Court has performed this deferential review in two ways.  In
some instances, the Court has rejected the constitutional tests applied
to “civilian” legislation and instead has applied a different, more leni-
ent test for “military” statutes and regulations.  For example, in assess-
ing due process challenges to the military justice system, the Court
rejected the proposed application of its ordinary due process stan-
dards and instead held that, in the military context, a special, more
deferential test would apply.30  Thus, in the context of military legisla-
tion, a due process challenge will be upheld only if “the factors militat-
ing in favor [of the plaintiff’s position] are so extraordinarily weighty
28. Id. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305).
29. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65–66 (1981) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)); see also Solorio v. United States, 483
U.S. 435, 448 (1987) (“The notion that civil courts are ‘ill equipped’ to establish policies
regarding matters of military concern is substantiated by experience under the service con-
nection approach.” (alteration in original) (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305)); Mid-
dendorf, 425 U.S. at 44 (adopting the observation of a United States Court of Military
Appeals judge that courts “possess[ ] no special competence to evaluate the effect of a
particular procedure on morale and discipline and to require its implementation over and
above the balance struck by Congress” (quoting United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298,
308 (1973) (Darden, C.J., dissenting))).
30. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177.
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as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.”31  By contrast, in
Rostker v. Goldberg,32 the Court refused to apply a different, more leni-
ent test for gender-based equal protection challenges in the military
context, concluding that there was little to be gained from “further
refinement” of the applicable equal protection standards.33  Instead,
the Court concluded that the appropriate course was to apply the
same equal protection standards applicable in “civilian” cases, but to
apply those tests in a more lenient way to account for the enhanced
degree of deference to which Congress was entitled for legislation
concerning military affairs.34  Regardless of the mechanical means
used by the Court to implement the military deference doctrine, it
bears mention that since 1974—which, as I have argued elsewhere, is
the advent of the Court’s modern military deference doctrine35—the
Court has never invalidated legislation or regulations governing mili-
tary affairs in a case in which it has invoked and applied the more
deferential review called for under the military deference doctrine.36
This is so even though the Court has repeatedly noted in these cases
that the Bill of Rights applies to the military and that the Court has
31. Id. at 177–78 (quoting Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 44).  The Levy Court similarly used a
deferential test for considering “void for vagueness” challenges to criminal offenses under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, holding that the lenient “void for vagueness” test for
criminal statutes controlling economic dealings should apply “[b]ecause of the factors dif-
ferentiating military society from civilian society.”  Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756–57
(1974).
32. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
33. Id. at 69–70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See id. at 71–72.
35. O’Connor, supra note 8, at 164, 215.  The historical development of the military R
deference doctrine is addressed in some detail in Part III of this Article.
36. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006) (rejecting a First Amend-
ment challenge to the Solomon Amendment); Weiss, 510 U.S. at 181 (rejecting a due pro-
cess challenge to a statute that permitted military judges to serve without some fixed term
of office); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450–51 (1987) (rejecting a constitutional
challenge to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over alleged offenses committed by a
serviceman but not connected to his military service); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 509–10 (1986) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to an Air Force regulation that
prevented on-duty officers from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform); Goldberg, 453 U.S.
at 83 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the Military Selective Service Act); Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to Air Force
regulations that required pre-approval of petitions circulated within a military base); Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a military
base regulation that prohibited partisan political speeches and leaflet distribution on the
base); Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 48 (rejecting Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges to a
statute that provided that defendants have no right to counsel at summary court-martial
proceedings); Levy, 417 U.S. at 738, 760–61 (rejecting due process and First Amendment
challenges to a statute that criminalized “conduct unbecoming an officer” and conduct “to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 10 U.S.C. §§ 933–934 (2000))).
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not abdicated its duty to review constitutional challenges to military
practices.37
This review of the rationales underlying the military deference
doctrine—and the words used by the Court to express its conception
of the doctrine—is important because it demonstrates why it is not
useful to draw conclusions about the military deference doctrine by
examining results from a pool of all “military” cases decided by the
Court.  The military deference doctrine is at once both potent and
limited.  The doctrine is potent because, as noted above, the Court
has not invalidated a statute or regulation governing the military in a
case in which it has invoked and applied the military deference doc-
trine in the thirty years since the Court first began applying the doc-
trine.38  Nevertheless, the military deference doctrine is limited
because it only applies to a subset of cases in which the military has an
interest: principally certain types of constitutional challenges to stat-
utes or regulations governing the armed forces.
This fundamental limitation on the reach of the military defer-
ence doctrine is evident from the language that the Court uses to de-
scribe it.  For example, in Solorio v. United States,39 a case in which the
Court overruled Warren Court precedent placing due process limita-
tions on the subject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial,40 the Court
explained that the military deference doctrine applies “when legisla-
tive action under the congressional authority to raise and support ar-
mies and make rules and regulations for their governance is
challenged.”41  The Solorio Court further observed that the Court had
“adhered to this principle of deference in a variety of contexts where,
as here, the constitutional rights of servicemen were implicated.”42  In-
37. See, e.g., Weiss, 510 U.S. at 176 (“Congress, of course, is subject to the requirements
of the Due Process Clause when legislating in the area of military affairs, and that Clause
provides some measure of protection to defendants in military proceedings.”); Goldman,
475 U.S. at 507 (“These aspects of military life do not, of course, render entirely nugatory
in the military context the guarantees of the First Amendment.”); Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 67
(“In that area [of military affairs], as any other, Congress remains subject to the limitations
of the Due Process Clause . . . .”); Brown, 444 U.S. at 354 (“[M]embers of the military
services are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment . . . .”); Middendorf, 425 U.S.
at 43 (“We recognize that plaintiffs . . . are entitled to the due process of law guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment.”); Levy, 417 U.S. at 758 (“[M]embers of the military are not ex-
cluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment . . . .”).
38. See supra note 36. R
39. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
40. Id. at 450–51.
41. Id. at 447 (quoting Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508).
42. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).  While the Solorio Court discussed the application of
the military deference doctrine in the context of constitutional claims asserted by ser-
vicemembers, it is clear that the doctrine similarly affects the rights of nonservicemembers
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deed, the limited scope of the military deference doctrine is apparent
from the very essence of deference itself.  The military deference doc-
trine manifests itself through judicial reluctance to upset legislative
and executive branch judgments as to the proper balance between
military needs and constitutional rights.43  Thus, the starting point for
a military deference case is a statute or regulation governing military
affairs and a litigant’s claim that the statute or regulation as written
violates his or her constitutional rights.
Moreover, the rationale underlying the military deference doc-
trine supports the doctrine’s application only for some, but not all,
constitutional challenges to “military” statutes or regulations, and the
Court has implicitly recognized as much.  Reduced to its essentials,
the military deference doctrine exists because, in the Court’s view, the
political branches are best able to assess the needs of the military and,
consequently, better able than the courts to balance the needs of the
military against the constitutional rights of those who might be af-
fected by a “military” statute or regulation.44  By its nature, then, the
military deference doctrine generally applies to constitutional chal-
lenges where a court has to balance some claimed constitutional right
against the claimed needs of the armed forces.  A broader applica-
tion—to disputes not involving an assessment of military need—would
extend the military deference doctrine beyond the principles that the
Court has used to justify it.45
when the statute or regulation legitimately governs military affairs. See, e.g., FAIR, 126 S. Ct.
at 1313 (holding, in part, that the Solomon Amendment did not violate law schools’ First
Amendment right to freedom of expressive association); Greer, 424 U.S. at 837–38 (apply-
ing the military deference doctrine to civilian political candidates’ First Amendment
claims).
43. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996); Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177;
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 448; Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507–08; Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 64–66; Mid-
dendorf, 425 U.S. at 44.
44. See cases cited supra note 43 (illustrating the purpose of the military deference R
doctrine).
45. I can conceive of a few instances where the military deference doctrine, given its
limited rationale, could apply outside of constitutional challenges.  First, if Congress were
to enact a statute that allowed certain conduct by the President or military officials “to the
extent necessary for military readiness,” or some similar standard, one could envision the
Court holding that it was not about to second-guess the executive branch’s view as to the
extent of military need in the face of a statutory challenge to military actions.  Congress
enacted a statute of similar structure in 1795 that allowed the President to call forth the
militia “whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion
from any foreign nation or Indian tribe.”  Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29
(1827) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1
Stat. 424).  In Martin, a case decided before the Court adopted its current military defer-
ence framework, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to second-guess the President’s
determination that an invasion was imminent. Id. at 30.  If such a statute were in force
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A number of constitutional provisions and rights are not abso-
lute; they require a court to consider the challenge in light of the
government’s interest in the statute or regulation at issue.  For exam-
ple, courts evaluate equal protection challenges by considering the
importance of the government’s interest in the classification at issue
and determining the extent to which the challenged classification re-
lates to that governmental interest.46  Due process challenges to pro-
cedures for reviewing the deprivation of benefits ordinarily require
consideration of, among other things, “the Government’s interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”47  Indeed, since 1974, when, in my view, the Court first began
applying the military deference doctrine,48 the Court has repeatedly
invoked the doctrine in response to constitutional challenges where
the applicable test required a consideration of the government’s inter-
est in the challenged legislation or practice.49
By contrast, other constitutional provisions, often structural pro-
visions not contained in the Bill of Rights, are absolute in their com-
mand and are not susceptible to a balancing of individual rights versus
governmental need.  That is, these provisions are black-and-white;
they either have been satisfied or not satisfied.  Since 1974, when the
Supreme Court first began using its current deference terminology to
today, it is possible that the Court could hold that review was barred by the political ques-
tion doctrine, or the Court conceivably could apply the military deference doctrine to
perform a deferential review of the President’s determination that some particular action
was necessary for military readiness.  Similarly, to the extent some nonconstitutional doc-
trine required consideration of governmental interest in order to evaluate the plaintiff’s
claim, it is conceivable that the Court could apply a variation of the military deference
doctrine to recognize its relative lack of competence in assessing military need.  Such a
strain of analysis can be seen in Schlesinger v. Councilman, in which the Court invoked the
specialized nature of the military community and its enhanced need for obedience and
discipline in holding that civilian courts ordinarily should not enjoin the prosecution of
courts-martial proceedings on constitutional grounds.  420 U.S. 738, 756–58 (1975).  The
Councilman Court noted that the military need for obedience and discipline figured into
the equitable considerations governing whether a federal court order enjoining court-
martial proceedings was appropriate. Id. at 756–57.  Thus, for example, the military defer-
ence doctrine presumably could apply to preliminary injunction proceedings, where courts
balance the equities involved and assess the effect of an injunction on the parties and on
the public interest.
46. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.”); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause requires only that economic legislation is rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest).
47. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
48. O’Connor, supra note 8, at 226. R
49. See cases cited supra note 43. R
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decide military cases, there have been a few instances where the Court
has considered whether a statute or regulation governing the military
violated one of these black-and-white constitutional commands.  In
deciding these cases, the Court has not invoked the military deference
doctrine—a jurisprudential method consistent with the military defer-
ence doctrine’s narrow application to consideration of government
interest and military necessity.
The dichotomy, for military deference purposes, between consti-
tutional challenges requiring consideration of government interest
and those not implicating such concerns, is well illustrated in Weiss v.
United States.50  In Weiss, the petitioner had been convicted of larceny
at a special court-martial and challenged his conviction on two
grounds: first, that the military judge presiding over his court-martial
had not been appointed in accordance with the Constitution’s Ap-
pointments Clause,51 and second, that the lack of a fixed term of of-
fice for the military judge violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.52
In considering the Appointments Clause challenge, the Court did
not reference or apply the military deference doctrine, but instead
applied its ordinary “civilian” Appointments Clause jurisprudence, ex-
plicitly holding that the Appointments Clause applies to military
judges.53  The Court did reference the military’s status as a “special-
ized society separate from civilian society,”54 but it did not do so in
order to justify a deferential review.  Rather, the Court noted that one
prong of its Appointments Clause jurisprudence considered whether
the duties being performed by the government officer were “ger-
mane” to an official appointment previously received by the officer.55
In that vein, the Court merely noted that the military is a specialized
community in which “all military officers, consistent with a long tradi-
tion, play a role in the operation of the military justice system.”56
Thus, the Court did not use the military’s unique place in American
life to justify a more deferential Appointments Clause analysis.  In-
stead it conducted the same “germaneness” analysis that it would in
any “civilian” situation.57  Such an analysis necessarily requires consid-
50. 510 U.S. 163 (1994).
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
52. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 165–66.
53. Id. at 173–76.
54. Id. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 743 (1974)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 175.
57. See id. at 174–76 (articulating the Court’s “germaneness” analysis).
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eration of the functions traditionally performed by a particular gov-
ernment office, and whether the duties performed by the officer at
issue were germane to the duties traditionally performed by the gov-
ernment office.58  Having concluded that the duties performed by a
military judge were germane to the duties traditionally assumed by
commissioned officers, the Court concluded that military judges’ orig-
inal appointment as commissioned officers satisfied the Appointments
Clause and that a second appointment to the office of military judge
was not required by the Appointments Clause.59
By contrast, in deciding the petitioner’s due process challenge,
the Court began, and essentially ended, with the military deference
doctrine.  After a full-blown exposition on the considerable deference
shown by the Court to Congress’s judgments regarding the military,
the Court proceeded to consider the appropriate due process test to
be applied.60  The Court rejected the positions of the petitioner and
the Government, both of which had proposed application of “civilian”
due process tests, and it instead adopted the distinctly deferential
“military” test applied in Middendorf v. Henry:61 whether the factors
militating in favor of fixed terms of office for military judges “are so
extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Con-
gress.”62  Finding that Congress’s decision not to require fixed terms
of office for military judges satisfied this lenient standard, the Court
rejected the petitioner’s due process challenge.63
The Weiss Court’s disparate treatment of the Appointments
Clause and Due Process Clause challenges demonstrates the limits of
the military deference doctrine; the doctrine affects constitutional
analysis only where that analysis requires consideration of government
interest.  Where, as with an Appointments Clause challenge, govern-
ment interest is irrelevant to the applicable test, the military deference
doctrine is not applied.  Indeed, the Court made this limitation clear
in Ryder v. United States,64 the Court’s next Appointments Clause chal-
lenge to the service of military judges. Ryder involved an Appoint-
ments Clause challenge to the practice of appointing civilians, without
Senate confirmation, to the appellate court that reviewed court-
martial appeals for the Coast Guard.65
58. See id. at 175–76.
59. Id. at 176.
60. Id. at 177–78.
61. 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976).
62. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177–78 (quoting Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 44).
63. Id. at 181.
64. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
65. Id. at 179–80.
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Thus, in Ryder, unlike Weiss, the judges whose appointments were
being challenged did not have any sort of Senate-approved appoint-
ment to federal office at the time that they were designated as military
appellate judges.66  In applying its Appointments Clause jurispru-
dence, which did not require a weighing of government interest, the
Court neither applied nor even mentioned the military deference
doctrine in holding that the civilians’ designation as military appellate
judges ran afoul of the Appointments Clause.67  Even more recently,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces correctly
decided that a panel of the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals had
been improperly constituted because Senator Lindsey Graham, a lieu-
tenant colonel in the Air Force reserves, had been appointed to the
panel in violation of the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause,68
which prohibits United States Senators from holding other offices of
the United States.69  In deciding this constitutional challenge, the
court did not apply the military deference doctrine: a method of deci-
sion that was correct jurisprudentially because no part of the test for
assessing alleged violations of the Incompatibility Clause requires a
weighing of government interest.70  Simply put, Senator Graham’s ap-
pointment to the appellate court either violated the clause or it did
not, without regard to military interest or exigencies entering the
equation.
When the inherently limited application of the military deference
doctrine is taken into account, it becomes clear that Professor Licht-
man’s statistical model is of questionable predictive value.  Fundamen-
tally, Professor Lichtman’s analysis seeks to draw conclusions about
the military deference doctrine—a doctrine that applies to only a
small percentage of “military” cases decided by the Supreme Court—
by statistically analyzing a pool of all “military” cases, with the end re-
sult being that most of the cases taken into account have nothing to
do with the military deference doctrine.  Of course, Professor Licht-
man’s survey of military cases reaches some conclusions about the Su-
preme Court’s treatment of “military” cases that are in fact correct,
but his analysis reaches these conclusions by using an unsound analyti-
cal basis.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 187–88.
68. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”).
69. United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2, 7 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
70. Id. at 7.
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Take, for example, Professor Lichtman’s discussion of “substan-
tive clusters” where the military did noticeably better or worse before
the Supreme Court than its average rate of success.71  Professor Licht-
man notes that in two of these “substantive clusters”—conscientious
objector/draft exemption cases and soldier pay cases—the military’s
“win rate” is significantly less than its historical average in all “military”
cases.72  To the extent that one places credence in a statistical success
rate in cases before a court that has essentially unfettered discretion to
set its own docket—a highly questionable proposition in my view73—it
is entirely predictable that the military would fare worse in these cate-
gories of cases because they would almost never trigger a deferential
review.  As Professor Lichtman explains in his article, the conscien-
tious objector/draft exemption cases typically involve disputes over
whether an individual qualifies for a statutory exemption from the
draft, or whether the draft board properly applied the required proce-
dures in assessing an individual’s claim.74  But the military deference
doctrine does not apply to cases considering whether the military
complied with statutes or regulations, but rather applies when an indi-
vidual litigant challenges the constitutionality of a statute or regulation
governing military affairs.75  Indeed, if Congress, as the branch of gov-
ernment constitutionally empowered to raise armies and regulate the
armed forces,76 established an exemption from the draft, it would be
the antithesis of deference for a court to construe the exemption
more narrowly so that the military could “win” a draft exemption case.
The same is true of the soldier pay cases cited by Professor Lichtman,
where the disputes centered around the application of statutes and
regulations, instead of an evaluation of allegations that the statutes or
regulations, as written, were unconstitutional.77  Thus, it is hardly sur-
71. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 929–36. R
72. Id. at 929–30.
73. One of the principal problems with assigning weight to statistical “win rates” before
the Supreme Court is that at least one of the litigants “wins” when the Supreme Court
declines to grant review of a lower court decision, yet that “win” never shows up in the
Court’s record of reported decisions.  For example, if the Court were of the view that some
military regulation is constitutional, why should it count as a “win” for the military if the
court of appeals gets it wrong and the Supreme Court has to grant certiorari to reverse, but
does not appear in the statistics if the court of appeals gets it right and the Court merely
denies a petition for writ of certiorari?
74. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 929. R
75. See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 161 (“[T]he military deference doctrine requires R
that a court considering certain constitutional challenges to military legislation perform a
more lenient constitutional review than would be appropriate if the challenged legislation
were in the civilian context.”).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 12.
77. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 930–31. R
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prising that litigants asserting claims where the political branches are
not entitled to deference statistically fare better as a group when com-
pared to a universe of cases in which some percentage of the cases
involve litigants fighting a decidedly uphill battle against the applica-
tion of the military deference doctrine.78
Of course, what this proves is that Professor Lichtman’s statistical
analysis identified a few clusters of cases where something appears to
be different because of the military’s anomalously low rate of success
in the Supreme Court.79  But the analytical method for reaching this
(ultimately correct) conclusion is backwards.  If the Supreme Court
merely issued one-line orders announcing that a lower court’s deci-
sion was either affirmed or reversed, it might make sense to attempt to
draw conclusions about the Court’s jurisprudential thought by statisti-
cally analyzing the military’s wins and loses.  But we live in a world
where the Court actually explains the reasons for its decisions.  There
is no guesswork in divining the Court’s analytical method, as it is set
forth in the opinions that accompany the Court’s rulings.
Simply reading the Court’s military deference decisions, dis-
cussed above,80 discloses the contours of the military deference doc-
trine and makes it readily apparent that cases involving the application,
construction, or compliance with statutes or regulations bearing on the
military’s affairs will almost never trigger a deferential review, mean-
ing that there is no thumb on the scale that would give the military a
better-than-expected chance of winning its cases.  Using “win-loss” sta-
tistics to render conclusions about the scope of the military deference
doctrine, instead of reaching those conclusions from how the Court
explains the doctrine in its opinions, is a little like trying to determine
what the weather is like outside by studying a weather almanac to see
what the weather is usually like on the date in question instead of
78. Indeed, even before the Court adopted the military deference doctrine, the Court
had gone through a lengthy period of time where its jurisprudential approach to constitu-
tional challenges to military statutes and regulations was to deny jurisdiction and leave the
matter to the political branches. See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 165–97 (discussing the R
Court’s doctrine of “noninterference,” which prevailed for the most part from the Court’s
first consideration of constitutional challenges in the military context until the mid-1950s).
The proliferation of noninterference cases in Professor Lichtman’s statistical model also
makes it predictable that cases, such as draft exemption and soldier pay cases, which ordi-
narily do not involve a constitutional challenge, would have a greater success rate for the
individual litigant than the remaining universe of cases, which includes both deference
and noninterference cases.
79. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 929. R
80. See supra notes 20–37 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court’s military defer- R
ence doctrine decisions).
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simply walking outside.81  The statistical inquiry might prove correct,
but it is not fail-safe, and certainly not the best available way to reach
the right answer.
III. THE CENTRALITY OF TIMING TO THE COURT’S MILITARY
DEFERENCE JURISPRUDENCE
Professor Lichtman’s methodological approach eschews a time-
based analysis—one that examines how the Court’s military deference
jurisprudence has evolved over time—and instead seeks to reach con-
clusions about the military deference doctrine by examining the
Court’s “military” decisions on a subject-matter basis, without regard
to when the decisions were issued.82  Such an approach is fundamen-
tally flawed, as an examination of the Court’s military deference juris-
prudence demonstrates that time, and not subject, is the principal
variable around which the Court’s jurisprudence is properly organ-
ized.  The time of the decision matters far more than the subject mat-
ter of the dispute in predicting the result of disputes that fall within
the scope of the Court’s modern military deference doctrine.
Professor Lichtman justifies his subject-matter approach by char-
acterizing the Court’s military deference doctrine as a more or less
unitary jurisprudential approach that has changed in only minor ways
over the years.  As stated by Professor Lichtman:
This [military deference] tradition has also undergone a sub-
tle evolution.  As John O’Connor has pointed out, in the
early days of the tradition, the Supreme Court’s deferential
posture took the form of what he called “noninterference,”
in which the Court opted to screen off military matters from
judicial consideration entirely, engaging in a pointed “re-
fusal to conduct a substantive review, no matter how lenient,
of military practices.”  It was only later that the Court’s ap-
proach took on a more affirmatively deferential tone, in
which the Court would consider the military’s position on a
81. Cf. In re Marriage of Rosen, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  The Rosen
court stated:
The correct rule on the necessity of expert testimony has been summarized by
Bob Dylan: “You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.”
The California courts, although in harmony, express the rule somewhat less color-
fully and hold expert testimony is not required where a question is resolvable by
common knowledge.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 910–11. R
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given subject and accord that view significant weight in its
own deliberations.83
While the Court’s traditional respect for precedent might give a de-
gree of intuitive sensibility to Professor Lichtman’s theory of a subtly
evolving military deference doctrine,84 such a hypothesis is not borne
out by history.  The “evolution” of the Court’s military deference juris-
prudence was not subtle; it was seismic.
In describing changes to the Court’s analytical approach in con-
stitutional challenges to military statutes and regulations as “subtle,”
Professor Lichtman’s analysis gives short shrift to the period of nearly
two decades between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s when the
Court was anything but deferential to political branch choices con-
cerning the regulation of military affairs.  During that period, the
Court was openly hostile to the notion that the military could appro-
priately respect the constitutional rights of persons within its pur-
view.85  This hostility stands in stark contrast to the Court’s
confidence, expressed in its decisions since the mid-1970s, in the su-
perior ability of the political branches to balance constitutional rights
and military needs,86 and the Court’s seeming disinterest, expressed
in decisions prior to the mid-1950s, in the political branches’ ability to
balance these sometimes competing values.87  Arguing that similarities
between the pre-1950s era of noninterference and the Court’s current
military deference doctrine reflect a “subtle evolution” in the Court’s
jurisprudence, without acknowledging the lengthy period when the
Court was anything but deferential, is akin to an Englishman describ-
ing the transition from the regime of King Charles I to King Charles II
as a subtle evolution, without acknowledging a fairly significant revolu-
tion in between and a lengthy period of time in which England had
no monarch.88  That the starting point and the finishing point have
83. Id. at 915 (footnote omitted) (quoting O’Connor, supra note 8, at 170). R
84. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26–27
(1994) (“Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal commu-
nity as a whole.  They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand
unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips
Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
85. See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 197–214. R
86. See id. at 226–61 (describing the development of the modern military deference
doctrine).
87. See id. at 165–97 (describing the Court’s earlier doctrine of noninterference with
respect to challenges to statutes and regulations governing the military).
88. 2 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE NEW
WORLD 201–58 (1956).
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significant similarities does not mean that the road was not bumpy
along the way.
The Court’s abrupt changes in its framework for considering
challenges to military statutes and practices is most evident in the lan-
guage used by the Court in deciding such cases.  Prior to the late
1950s, the Court’s disinclination to inquire into the constitutionality
of military practices was palpable.  In the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, the Court issued a number of decisions in which it inti-
mated that the Constitution placed no limits on court-martial
procedure, and that the federal courts’ sole purpose in reviewing col-
lateral attacks on court-martial convictions was to ensure that the
court-martial had jurisdiction over the person and offense in accor-
dance with the statutory framework enacted by Congress.89
Even into the 1950s, the Court’s rhetoric in considering legal
challenges to military practices was notably strident, with the Court
advising that it was not the role of the courts to concern themselves
with the political branches’ policy choices in regulating the military.
A trio of cases from that era illustrate the Court’s tone in addressing
such challenges.  In Whelchel v. McDonald,90 Justice Douglas, writing
for a unanimous Court, rejected a servicemember’s claim that his
court-martial conviction was invalid because there were no enlisted
soldiers on the court-martial panel:
89. See, e.g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 346 (1907).  The Grafton Court
stated:
The [court-martial] had jurisdiction over the person and the case.  It is the organ-
ism provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class
of cases.  Having had such jurisdiction, its proceedings cannot be collaterally im-
peached for any mere error or irregularity, if there were such, committed within
the sphere of its authority.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879)); see
also Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 118 (1895) (“The court martial having jurisdiction of
the person accused and of the offence charged, and having acted within the scope of its
lawful powers, its decision and sentence cannot be reviewed or set aside by the civil courts,
by writ of habeas corpus or otherwise.”); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. at 21 (“The constitutionality
of the acts of Congress touching army and navy courts-martial in this country, if there
could ever have been a doubt about it, is no longer an open question in this court.”).  In
Dynes v. Hoover, the Court stated:
These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
punishment of military and naval offences in the manner then and now practiced
by civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given without any connection
between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of
the United States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely independent of each
other.
61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
90. 340 U.S. 122 (1950).
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The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment is not applicable to trials by courts-martial or military
commissions.  Courts-martial have been composed of officers
both before and after the adoption of the Constitution.  The
constitution of courts-martial, like other matters relating to
their organization and administration, is a matter appropri-
ate for congressional action.91
In 1953, the Court in Burns v. Wilson92 rejected two habeas corpus
petitioners’ claims that their capital murder court-martial proceedings
had suffered from a number of serious constitutional defects.93  In
rejecting the petitioners’ claims, the Court focused on the unique na-
ture of courts-martial as institutions established and regulated by Con-
gress as part of its power to govern the affairs of the armed forces:
Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which ex-
ists separate and apart from the law which governs in our
federal judicial establishment.  This Court has played no role
in its development; we have exerted no supervisory power
over the courts which enforce it; the rights of men in the
armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain
overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil
courts are not the agencies which must determine the pre-
cise balance to be struck in this adjustment.  The Framers
expressly entrusted that task to Congress.94
Also in 1953, in Orloff v. Willoughby,95 the Court rejected a habeas
corpus petition by a physician who had been drafted but was not per-
mitted to serve as a military doctor because of concerns about his
prior membership in organizations deemed by the Attorney General
to be subversive.96  Again, the Court rejected the petitioner’s chal-
lenge based on its view that the Court had no legitimate role in over-
seeing decisions made by the military in managing military personnel:
We know that from top to bottom of the Army the com-
plaint is often made, and sometimes with justification, that
91. Id. at 126–27 (citations and footnote omitted).
92. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
93. Id. at 146 (plurality opinion).  Among the defects alleged by the petitioners were
that they had been subjected to illegal detention, that their confessions had been coerced,
that they had been denied their counsel of choice, that military authorities suppressed
exculpatory evidence, that military authorities procured perjured testimony, and that
“their trials were conducted in an atmosphere of terror and vengeance, conducive to mob
violence instead of fair play.” Id. at 138.
94. Id. at 140 (footnotes omitted).
95. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
96. Id. at 85–86, 94–95.
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there is discrimination, favoritism or other objectionable
handling of men.  But judges are not given the task of run-
ning the Army.  The responsibility for setting up channels
through which such grievances can be considered and fairly
settled rests upon the Congress and upon the President of
the United States and his subordinates.  The military consti-
tutes a specialized community governed by a separate disci-
pline from that of the civilian.  Orderly government requires
that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legiti-
mate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to
intervene in judicial matters.97
Beginning in the mid-1950s, though, the Court not only began
regularly deciding constitutional challenges to military statutes and
practices against the military, but it did so using rhetoric that ex-
pressed overt skepticism as to the political branches’ ability and/or
willingness to protect constitutional rights in ordering military affairs.
Gone were the days when the Court expressed a lack of interest in
involving itself in military affairs, replaced by an era in which the
Court’s analytical framework was based on an institutional view that
military practices—and in particular longstanding practices within the
military justice system—were constitutionally suspect.
This sea change in jurisprudential approach began with a series
of personal jurisdiction cases decided in the 1950s and early 1960s.  In
1950, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ),98 which placed all services under a single set of regulations
for conducting courts-martial.  The UCMJ provided for court-martial
jurisdiction over certain classes of civilians stationed overseas, includ-
ing spouses of servicemembers and civilian employees residing on for-
eign military bases.99  The UCMJ also provided for court-martial
jurisdiction over crimes committed by former servicemembers while
on active duty, which were punishable by confinement for five years or
more and not triable in any civilian court in the United States—a pro-
vision that essentially covered serious offenses committed overseas.100
One by one, the Court considered these provisions in the 1950s and
97. Id. at 93–94.
98. Ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–940
(2000)). See generally Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953) (explaining the creation of the UCMJ by its principal
draftsman). See also Frederick Bernays Wiener, American Military Law in the Light of the First
Mutiny Act’s Tricentennial, 126 MIL. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (1989) (discussing the enactment of
the UCMJ and the motivations behind its birth).
99. 64 Stat. at 109 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 802).
100. Id. at 109–10 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 803).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 24  9-MAY-07 9:53
2007] STATISTICS AND THE MILITARY DEFERENCE DOCTRINE 691
1960s, found them unconstitutional, and in doing so, provided harsh
commentary on the fitness of the military to protect constitutional
rights.
The revolution began with a whimper, however.  In 1952, the
Court considered a habeas corpus petition by a servicemember’s wife
who had been convicted not by a court-martial, but by the United
States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, an entity
established to try criminal offenses occurring in occupied Germany.101
In rejecting the petitioner’s challenge, the Court gratuitously noted
that she could have been tried not only by the occupation court that
convicted her, but by a court-martial as well.102  By 1955, however, the
Court’s hostility toward the assertion of court-martial jurisdiction over
nonservicemembers was in full flourish, with the Court employing stri-
dent, almost superfluous, language to nearly characterize courts-
martial as a necessary evil.
In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,103 the Court held that the
military’s exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over a former ser-
vicemember for a murder allegedly committed while on active duty in
Korea, although jurisdiction was permitted under the terms of the
UCMJ, ran afoul of the Constitution.104  In so holding, the Court pro-
vided an extended commentary on its views of the quality of justice
meted out in courts-martial:
There are dangers lurking in military trials which were
sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of
our Constitution.  Free countries of the world have tried to
restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction
deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among
troops in active service. . . .  But Army discipline will not be
improved by court-martialing rather than trying by jury some
civilian ex-soldier who has been wholly separated from the
service for months, years or perhaps decades.  Consequently
considerations of discipline provide no excuse for new ex-
pansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the
normal and constitutionally preferable system of trial by
jury.105
101. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 342–43, 357 (1952).
102. See id. at 345 (“Both United States courts-martial, and United States Military Com-
missions or tribunals in the nature of such commissions, had jurisdiction in Germany in
1949–1950 to try persons in the status of petitioner on the charge against her.” (emphasis
omitted)).
103. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
104. Id. at 13, 23.
105. Id. at 22–23 (footnote omitted).
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Over the succeeding years, the Court employed similar rhetoric
in rejecting court-martial jurisdiction over civilian employees and
spouses of servicemembers stationed on military bases overseas.  After
initially upholding the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over mili-
tary dependents stationed overseas on the last day of the 1955
Term,106 the Court granted a rehearing the next Term and rejected
the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over both petitioners.107
Again, the plurality’s analytical framework was based on the accepted
fact that courts-martial were inherently suspect in their ability to safe-
guard constitutional rights:
Military law is, in many respects, harsh law which is fre-
quently cast in very sweeping and vague terms.  It emphasizes
the iron hand of discipline more tha[n] it does the even
scales of justice.
. . . .
In summary, “it still remains true that military tribunals
have not been and probably never can be constituted in such
way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that
the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civil-
ians in federal courts.”  In part this is attributable to the in-
herent differences in values and attitudes that separate the
military establishment from civilian society.  In the military,
by necessity, emphasis must be placed on the security and
order of the group rather than on the value and integrity of
the individual.108
The Court’s institutionalized hostility to the military justice sys-
tem in the late 1950s and 1960s was not confined to Congress’s at-
tempt under the UCMJ to subject civilians to trial by court-martial.  In
106. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 473, 480 (1956), rev’d sub nom., Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 488, 492 (1956),
rev’d, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion).
107. See supra note 106.  For commentary on the Covert decision by two eminent military R
justice commentators, see Robinson O. Everett, Persons Who Can Be Tried by Court-Martial, 5
J. PUB. L. 148, 162–63 (1956), and Wiener, supra note 98, at 50–54. R
108. Covert, 354 U.S. at 38–39 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).  Three years
later, the Court similarly held that the Constitution precluded the exercise of court-martial
jurisdiction over civilian employees and military dependents for both capital and noncapi-
tal offenses. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (holding
unconstitutional the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian government em-
ployees for noncapital offenses); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (holding uncon-
stitutional the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian government employees for
capital offenses); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (holding
unconstitutional the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over military dependents for
noncapital offenses).
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O’Callahan v. Parker,109 the petitioner, an active duty servicemember,
had been convicted by court-martial of assault and attempted rape.110
Although the UCMJ, by its terms, allowed O’Callahan to be tried by
court-martial based on his status as an active duty servicemember,
O’Callahan argued that the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction was
unconstitutional because the offense was not connected to his active
duty service.111  In holding that the exercise of court-martial jurisdic-
tion for non-service-connected crimes was unconstitutional, the
O’Callahan majority engaged in a lengthy diatribe about the quality of
the military justice system:
While the Court of Military Appeals takes cognizance of
some constitutional rights of the accused who are court-
martialed, courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept
in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law. . . .  A
civilian trial, in other words, is held in an atmosphere condu-
cive to the protection of individual rights, while a military
trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive
justice.
As recently stated: “None of the travesties of justice per-
petrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising, for mili-
tary law has always been and continues to be primarily an
instrument of discipline, not justice.”112
In a final coup de graˆce, the O’Callahan Court added a footnote to the
above-quoted language in which it referred to the “so-called military
justice” system.113  Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the Court’s hostility
to the military justice system was readily apparent from its decisions.
By the mid-1970s, however, the Court had made a complete
about-face in the rhetoric with which it described the military justice
system as well as its role in overseeing that system.  Gone were descrip-
109. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
110. Id. at 259–60.
111. See id. at 260–61.  O’Callahan’s charged offenses occurred while he was on author-
ized liberty, off base, and in civilian attire. Id. at 259.  O’Callahan’s argument that the
Constitution limited court-martial jurisdiction to service-connected offenses was first raised
in a law review article published nearly a decade earlier.  Robert D. Duke & Howard S.
Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13
VAND. L. REV. 435, 440–49 (1960).
112. O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265–66 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ira Glasser, Justice and
Captain Levy, 12 COLUM. F. 46, 49 (1969)).  For an interesting discussion of the O’Callahan
decision and the application of the service-connection rule announced therein, see Robin-
son O. Everett, O’Callahan v. Parker—Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice?, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 853.
113. O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 266 n.7.
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tions of the military justice system as “so-called military justice,”114
“singularly inept” in protecting constitutional rights,115 an organ of
“retributive justice,”116 marked by “travesties of justice perpetrated
under the UCMJ,”117 “emphasiz[ing] the iron hand of discipline more
tha[n] it does the even scales of justice,”118 and as a system that can-
not have the “qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essen-
tial to fair trials” in the civilian context.119  Instead, as the Court began
to develop its modern military deference doctrine beginning in the
1970s, the Court’s opinions focused on issues of constitutional
structure.
Rather than offering value judgments—accurate or not—on the
quality of justice meted out at courts-martial, or the military’s ability to
respect the constitutional rights of its members, the Court’s starting
point in addressing challenges to a military statute or practice was the
Constitution’s grant of power to Congress and the President to man-
age the armed forces.  The Court considered those branches’ superior
ability to balance constitutional rights against military needs, and the
judiciary’s institutional incompetence in assessing the effect any par-
ticular ruling might have on military readiness.  Not coincidentally,
the military began winning more cases once the Court shifted from its
institutional skepticism of military justice and toward a paradigm cen-
tered on the political branches’ superior ability to conduct the balanc-
ing required when individual rights potentially clashed with military
necessity.120
It is difficult to discern how one could read the Supreme Court’s
decisions from the mid-1950s through the end of the 1960s and con-
clude, as Professor Lichtman does, that the Court’s tradition of mili-
tary deference has “undergone a subtle evolution”121 since the period
before the mid-1950s, when the Court had an express “hands off” ap-
proach to constitutional challenges to military practices,122 until the
114. Id.
115. See id. at 265.
116. Id. at 266.
117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Glasser, supra note 112, at 49). R
118. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38 (1957) (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 39 (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
120. The rhetoric employed by the Court in applying the modern military deference
doctrine is discussed in some detail in Part II of this Article. See also O’Connor, supra note
8, at 226–306 (discussing, in considerable detail, the language used by the Court in apply- R
ing the military deference doctrine).
121. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 915. R
122. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren famously described the Court’s “hands off” attitude
toward military regulations governing its own personnel in a 1962 law review article.  Earl
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 186–87 (1962).
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Court’s establishment and application of its current military defer-
ence doctrine.  The Court effectively rejected its prior policy of nonin-
terference utilized in the 1950s and 1960s when it struck down several
UCMJ provisions regarding court-martial jurisdiction and also
adopted a new rule that limited courts-martial to the trial of service-
connected offenses.123  By the mid-1970s, the Court had effectively re-
jected its prior institutional skepticism toward the military justice sys-
tem and replaced it with a jurisprudence based on the recognition
that the balance between individual rights and military needs prima-
rily should be struck by Congress and the President.124
One could argue that the difference between the era of noninter-
ference—which essentially meant no review—and the current military
deference doctrine—which involves a highly deferential review—is lit-
tle more than semantics.  Such a view could be entitled to some de-
gree of credence based on the fact that the Supreme Court, since it
began applying the military deference doctrine in the mid-1970s, has
never found the doctrine applicable and then proceeded to invalidate
some or all of the military practice being challenged.125  Regardless of
that debate, however, it is not correct to characterize the military def-
erence doctrine as having subtly evolved from the era of noninterfer-
ence to its present formulation.  Moreover, there is little reason to
draw conclusions on the scope of the Court’s tradition of military def-
erence by factoring into that analysis decisions from a bygone era
where the Court was decidedly not deferential.
While the Court’s own language in explaining its framework for
deciding “military” cases is probably the best evidence that the Court’s
jurisprudence has undergone two watershed changes over the years—
one in which the Court essentially abandoned its noninterference pol-
icy and the other when the Court rejected its prior hostility toward
military justice in favor of the military deference doctrine—mere rhet-
oric is not the only evidence.  If Professor Lichtman’s hypotheses—
that the Court’s military deference jurisprudence had undergone only
subtle changes over the years, and that the Court’s jurisprudence le-
123. See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text. R
124. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text. R
125. See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 226–306 (discussing Supreme Court decisions apply- R
ing the military deference doctrine).  Indeed, if one were to review the chart from Profes-
sor Lichtman’s article of “military” cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1974, when it
first began applying the military deference doctrine, none of the exceedingly few cases that
Professor Lichtman records as a “loss” by the military involved a case falling within the
scope of the military deference doctrine, as discussed in Part II of this Article, and the
Court did not purport to apply the doctrine in any of these “losses.” See Lichtman, supra
note 1, app. A at 950–53. R
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gitimately can be judged by subject matter instead of by timing of de-
cision—were correct, one would expect that like cases would be
decided the same way over the years.  That is, if the jurisprudence has
been more or less static, then results on various legal issues should be
the same over time.  But this has not been the case, and consistent
with the Court’s own rhetoric, the decisions less favorable to the mili-
tary’s position invariably occurred during the 1950s and 1960s.
This Article has already addressed the Court’s change in position
on the amenability of military dependents and civilian government
employees to court-martial jurisdiction when they are stationed over-
seas.126  In 1952, the Court observed, albeit in dictum, in Madsen v.
Kinsella127 that a court-martial would have had jurisdiction to try Mad-
sen for the murder of her husband, who had been an active duty ser-
vicemember stationed in Germany at the time of his death.128  In
1956, the Court upheld the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over
military dependents stationed with their spouses overseas in a pair of
cases, only to have those cases reargued the following year, with the
Court ultimately holding in both cases that the Constitution barred
the exercise of such jurisdiction by courts-martial.129  Thus, as the
Court was developing its collective view as to the merits of the military
justice system, it changed course from allowing the jurisdiction over
civilians enacted in the UCMJ to prohibiting the exercise of such juris-
diction, all in the space of one year.
Similarly, the Court reached seemingly irreconcilable results in
two cases addressing the proper application of Army Article of War
92,130 a pre-UCMJ provision that gave courts-martial jurisdiction over
charges of murder and rape taking place in the United States only
during time of war.131  In Kahn v. Anderson,132 the petitioners had
been tried by court-martial for a murder committed at Fort Leaven-
worth, Kansas, on July 29, 1918.133  The convicted soldiers sought a
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the hostilities of World War
126. See supra notes 101–108 and accompanying text. R
127. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
128. Id. at 342–43, 345.
129. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 473, 480 (1956), rev’d sub nom., Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 488, 492 (1956),
rev’d, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion).
130. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 664.
131. See id. (“[N]o person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed
within the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the District of Columbia in
time of peace.”).
132. 255 U.S. 1 (1921).
133. Id. at 5; see also Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231 (1959) (noting the date of the
offense at issue in Kahn).
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I had ceased before the date of their trials, therefore depriving the
court-martial of jurisdiction.134  The Court rejected the petitioners’ ar-
gument on the grounds that, although hostilities might have been
over by the time of the charged offenses, Congress’s declaration of
war against the Central Powers had not yet been rescinded.135  As the
Court explained: “It is therefore difficult to appreciate the reasoning
upon which it is insisted that, although the Government of the United
States was officially at war, nevertheless, so far as the regulation and
control by it of its army is concerned, it was at peace.”136
Now, fast-forwarding to 1959, when the Court was in the midst of
its period of considerable skepticism toward the exercise of court-mar-
tial jurisdiction, the Court reached the opposite result with respect to
offenses occurring at the end of World War II.  In Lee v. Madigan,137
the Court considered the identical argument raised in Kahn with re-
spect to a conviction for conspiracy to commit a murder that occurred
at Camp Cooke, California, in 1949.138  As in Kahn, the petitioner’s
offense had occurred after the cessation of actual hostilities but before
Congress officially terminated its declaration of war on Germany in
1951 and on Japan in 1952.139  Contrary to its decision in Kahn, how-
ever, the Court rejected the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction in
Lee.140  In reaching that result, the Court characterized as dicta the
portion of the Kahn opinion pertaining to the timing of the official
proclamation of peace and declared that a “particularized and dis-
criminating analysis” was required to determine whether the United
States was actually in a state of war at the time of the offense
charged.141  Without question, there are differences at the margins
between Kahn and Lee—after all, the offenses in Lee occurred nearly
four years after the end of active hostilities and over two years after
President Truman had declared the end of all hostilities.142  Neverthe-
less, it remains difficult to reconcile the two decisions given the
Court’s pronouncement in Kahn that actual rescission of a declaration
of war by Congress was the event that terminated court-martial juris-
134. Kahn, 255 U.S. at 9.
135. Id. at 9–10.
136. Id. at 9.
137. 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
138. Id. at 229.
139. Id. at 230.
140. Id. at 230–31, 236.
141. Id. at 230–31.
142. Id. at 229–30.
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diction under Army Article of War 92.143  The seemingly inconsistent
results are explainable, however, by the time in which each decision
was issued—Kahn during the Court’s era of noninterference and Lee
during the Court’s period of skepticism toward the military justice
system.
These examples show how the Court reached different results in
seemingly similar cases where one was decided in the Court’s era of
noninterference and the other decided in the late 1950s and 1960s,
with the decision less favorable to the military position coming second
in time.  This phenomenon also can be seen at work in the opposite
direction, in pairs of seemingly similar cases where the first occurred
prior to the Court’s adoption of the military deference doctrine and
the second occurred once that doctrine had been established by the
Court, with the second decision invariably being more favorable to the
military position.  In Flower v. United States,144 a case decided in 1972,
the Court summarily reversed the petitioner’s conviction for distribut-
ing leaflets along a public road within the limits of Fort Sam Houston,
Texas, when previously he had been prohibited from doing so by the
post’s deputy commander.145  In so holding, the Court observed that
the base commander could “no more order [the] petitioner off this
public street because he was distributing leaflets than could the city
police order any leafleteer off any public street.”146  Yet, four years
later, the Court upheld a base commander’s decision not to allow ap-
plicants to distribute campaign materials and conduct partisan politi-
cal speeches within public areas of Fort Dix.147  The Court attempted
to distinguish its Flower decision by stressing its understanding that the
road at issue in Flower “was a completely open street[ ] and that the
military had abandoned any claim that it has special interests in who
walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue.”148  This factual dis-
tinction is hardly convincing, though, because Fort Dix had a number
of public roads and footpaths that ran through the base, which were
open to use by civilian drivers and pedestrians; there was not usually a
guard posted at the base’s main entrances; and civilians were allowed
in any unrestricted area in the base.149  Perhaps sensing that its factual
143. See Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1921) (explaining that “the effect of the
Armistice and the cessation of hostilities” did not constitute peace “in the legal sense”
under Army Article of War 92).
144. 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 197–99.
146. Id. at 198.
147. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 832, 839–40 (1976).
148. Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flower, 407 U.S. at 198).
149. Id. at 830.
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distinctions were less than convincing, the Court added that Flower
had been decided “without the benefit of briefing or oral argu-
ment.”150  Instead, a more plausible explanation for the differing re-
sults is that Flower had been decided before the Court had developed
the military deference doctrine, while Greer was decided just as the
Court was formulating that doctrine.
Finally, in arguably the most astounding reversal within the
Court’s military jurisprudence, the Court in Solorio v. United States151
overruled its O’Callahan decision and abandoned its service-
connection limitation on court-martial jurisdiction, more than a dec-
ade into the Court’s modern military deference era.152  In all of the
other cases discussed above where the Court reached different results
on seemingly similar facts, the Court made at least a token effort to
distinguish the prior precedent on its facts, though none of these ef-
forts strike me as particularly convincing. Solorio involved no such ef-
fort.  Rather, the Court expressly rejected its prior decision in
O’Callahan, remarking that the O’Callahan precedent “must bow to the
lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning.”153  Indeed,
Justice Stevens’s concurrence accused the majority of “reaching out to
reexamine the decision[ ] in O’Callahan”154 when the Court could
have disposed of the case by finding that the offenses charged were in
fact service-connected under the test announced in O’Callahan.155
The juxtaposition of these sets of different results in similar cases, to-
gether with a review of the Court’s changing rhetoric, demonstrates
the significant difference in the Court’s treatment of constitutional
challenges to military practices in the late 1950s and 1960s as com-
pared to the period before and the period after this era.
One final note on the debate over whether military deference
decisions are best analyzed by subject matter or by time of decision.
Professor Lichtman’s own statistical approach shows a significant
change in the military’s “success rate” from the mid-1950s through the
1960s as compared to prior and later years.156  Professor Lichtman’s
150. Id. at 835.
151. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
152. Id. at 450–51.
153. Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
154. Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
155. See id. at 451–52 (asserting that, unless the Court disagreed with the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals’s conclusion that the petitioner’s crimes were sufficiently service-connected to
create court-martial jurisdiction, the propriety of the O’Callahan decision was not properly
before the Court).
156. See Lichtman, supra note 1, app. B at 965 (contrasting the military’s win-loss record R
in the Warren Court with preceding and subsequent Courts).
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“scorecard” has the military winning 75.9% of the cases decided dur-
ing the Vinson Court, which immediately preceded the Warren Court,
as well as 62.7% and 84.2%, respectively, of the cases decided during
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.157  Yet Professor Lichtman calcu-
lates that the military won only 44.4% of the cases it litigated during
the Warren Court from 1953 to 1969, a period that roughly coincides
with the period in which the Court’s rhetoric concerning military jus-
tice turned hostile.158  Thus, even Professor Lichtman’s “scorecard”
approach suggests an anomaly during the Warren Court as it relates to
military cases coming before the Court.
One of the principal theses of Professor Lichtman’s article is that
his subject-matter approach, borne out of a statistical computation of
the military’s “win-loss” record in the Supreme Court, reveals that the
military is most likely to lose cases in the Supreme Court when it is
attempting to exercise control over persons not in the armed
forces.159  As Professor Lichtman explains:
What these cases show is the one dimension of the Supreme
Court’s relationship with the military in which their worka-
day deference drops away: the Supreme Court’s tradition of
deference to the military does not extend—and, logically,
should not extend—to cases encompassing non-military per-
sons.  Instead, in these cases we see the Supreme Court tak-
ing an active role in reaffirming the constitutional
guarantees of everyday citizens; to a certain extent, then,
these cases really are not about the military at all.160
Not surprisingly, Professor Lichtman’s conclusion that the Court
declines to defer to the political branches in cases where the military
is seeking to impose its will on civilians is based on two clusters of
cases—conscientious objector cases and court-martial personal juris-
diction cases161—where the military deference doctrine typically
would not apply for reasons other than the civilian status of the indi-
vidual litigant.  The conscientious objector cases tell us little about the
military deference doctrine because they, for the most part, involve
applying statutes enacted by Congress, and not challenges to the consti-
tutionality of statutes enacted by Congress.  In those cases, the Court
defers to Congress by faithfully applying the framework established by
statute, and one would expect a Court inclined toward deference to
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 939–40.
160. Id. at 940.
161. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 939–40. R
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find for the conscientious objector when the military is seeking to de-
viate from the framework enacted by Congress.  With respect to the
cases characterized by Professor Lichtman as instances where the mili-
tary lost cases involving the court-martial of civilians, the majority of
those cases were decided in the period from 1959 to 1960, when the
Court’s jurisprudence was inclined toward hostility to military justice
in general, with the military repeatedly losing jurisdiction cases over
both civilians and active duty servicemembers.162
These methodological differences aside, Professor Lichtman’s
conclusion that “the Supreme Court’s tradition of deference to the
military does not extend—and, logically, should not extend—to cases
encompassing nonmilitary persons”163 is demonstrably incorrect.
Even starting with the handicap that the Court’s true military defer-
ence jurisprudence extends back only to 1974—a theory which neces-
sarily limits the pool of cases available to refute Professor Lichtman’s
thesis—there is no shortage of instances in which the military defer-
ence doctrine has been applied to burden civilians in the name of
military readiness.  In Greer v. Spock,164 the Court upheld the power of
a base commander to prohibit civilians from distributing leaflets on a
public street that happened to pass through Fort Dix.165  In reaching
that conclusion, the Court found it appropriate to defer to the mili-
tary’s determination that it was necessary to burden the free speech
rights of civilians in the name of fostering military readiness: “In short,
it is ‘the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to
fight wars should the occasion arise.’  And it is consequently the busi-
ness of a military installation like Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to
provide a public forum.”166
162. Id. app. B at 964 & n.178.  Professor Lichtman’s listing of cases involving attempts
by the military to court-martial civilians does not, but should, include Covert, a case where
the Court held unconstitutional the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over a military
dependent for a murder committed in Germany.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3, 5 (1957)
(plurality opinion); see also supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.  Regardless, as R
with the cases listed by Professor Lichtman, the Covert case was decided during the period
in which the Court was skeptical of the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction generally, both
in cases involving civilians and in cases involving military personnel. See supra notes
137–143 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s rejection of court-martial jurisdic- R
tion over a servicemember in Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959)); see also supra notes
109–113 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s adoption of the service- R
connection test for court-martial jurisdiction in O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)).
163. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 940. R
164. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
165. Id. at 832, 840.
166. Id. at 837–38 (citation omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
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Granted, Greer theoretically could be waved off as a case more
about the military’s authority to control conduct within the confines
of a military base and less about the military’s attempt to exercise con-
trol over civilians.  Fair enough.  But Professor Lichtman treats the
military’s attempt to prosecute a conscientious objector as the quintes-
sential case of the military’s exercise of control over a civilian where,
in Professor Lichtman’s formulation, the military deference doctrine
does not and should not apply.167  That notion is directly refuted by
the Court’s decision in Rostker v. Goldberg,168 where the Court rejected
a claim that the Military Selective Service Act violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it required men to register
with the selective service but did not impose the same requirement on
women.169  In rejecting the due process challenge, the Court explicitly
applied the military deference doctrine, noting that “[t]he case arises
in the context of Congress’ authority over national defense and mili-
tary affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Con-
gress greater deference.”170
Even more recently, the Court invoked the military deference
doctrine in Rumsfeld v. FAIR,171 where it rejected a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Solomon Amendment.172  The FAIR decision upheld
Congress’s right to place burdens on nonmilitary entities, that is, col-
leges and universities, by requiring them to provide certain access for
military recruiters as a condition of the receipt of specific types of
federal funds.173  If Professor Lichtman were correct that the military
deference doctrine does not apply when the dispute involves the im-
position of burdens on nonmilitary personnel,174 a discussion of the
doctrine would have had no place in the FAIR decision.  Instead, once
the Court had disposed of a question raised by amici concerning the
proper construction of the Solomon Amendment, the Court invoked
the military deference doctrine first in analyzing whether the statute,
as construed, was constitutional.175
All of this is not to say that the fact that a military statute or regu-
lation primarily burdens nonmilitary personnel or entities is irrelevant
to the military deference doctrine.  In balancing—however deferen-
167. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 939–40. R
168. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
169. Id. at 59, 78–79.
170. Id. at 64–65.
171. 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
172. Id. at 1306.
173. Id.
174. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 939–40. R
175. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306.
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tially—the individual rights at issue against the political branches’ as-
sessment of military need, it seems perfectly reasonable that a court
might consider the extent to which the statute or regulation affects
persons other than servicemembers.  In this age of an all-volunteer
military, it is reasonable for a court to distinguish in some circum-
stances between those who elected to submit to military authority and
civilians who did not.  But the point is that, contrary to Professor
Lichtman’s thesis, it is incorrect to assert that the military deference
doctrine does not apply where the aggrieved party is a civilian because
the historical record proves otherwise.
It also is far from clear that the lesson to be drawn from the mili-
tary deference doctrine is that the military is most likely to lose in the
Supreme Court when it seeks to burden civilians.  Most of the cases
that Professor Lichtman relies on for this proposition were issued in
the late 1950s and 1960s when the military was faring worse in all of its
cases, largely because of the Court’s changing view toward the proper
role of the courts in overseeing military justice matters.  Indeed, I
would posit that the military is most likely to lose cases in the Supreme
Court when it litigates those cases in the Warren Court, because the
timing of the case appears to be, by far, the most significant factor in
determining the degree to which the Court is likely to be deferential
to the political branches’ assessment of military need.
IV. THE MILITARY DEFERENCE DOCTRINE NOW AND IN THE FUTURE
As I have written elsewhere, one of the most important aspects of
the military deference doctrine, and one that many commentators
misunderstand,176 is that the military deference doctrine is not a
venerable doctrine that has existed since the early days of the Repub-
lic.177  Indeed, a review of the Court’s military deference jurispru-
dence could lead one to the conclusion that the doctrine was more or
less the brainchild of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote virtually
every important military deference decision that the Court has is-
176. While we clearly have different viewpoints concerning the utility of the military
deference doctrine, Professor Diane Mazur is one commentator who has correctly per-
ceived that the military deference doctrine is an outgrowth of a series of decisions issued in
the mid-1970s, most of which were authored by then-Justice Rehnquist. See Diane H.
Mazur, Rehnquist’s Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77
IND. L.J. 701, 704 (2002) (maintaining that the military deference doctrine was a creation
of then-Justice Rehnquist).
177. See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 306 (rejecting the myth that the military deference R
doctrine stems from the Court’s early nineteenth-century military jurisprudence).
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sued.178  While notions of stare decisis may militate against a retreat
from the military deference doctrine by the Court, the fact remains
that the doctrine is one of fairly recent vintage, which was developed
and perpetuated mainly through judicial opinions written by a Justice
who is no longer on the Court.  Moreover, while stare decisis is a nice
concept in the abstract, that doctrine did not prevent the Court from
radically changing its approach to constitutional challenges to military
practices twice before.  Therefore, it is not out of the realm of possibil-
ity that the military deference doctrine could recede in importance
with personnel changes on the Court.  This could occur through an
express overruling of the doctrine, through decisions narrowing the
doctrine’s application, or through a more subtle process whereby the
Court continues to pay lip service to its need to defer to political
branch judgments but nevertheless accords little or no actual defer-
ence to the policy determinations of Congress and the President.
But early indications from the Roberts Court, with Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor, respectively, provide reason to believe that the military
deference doctrine will continue to be a robust feature of the Court’s
military jurisprudence, at least in the near term.  In FAIR, the first
“military” case decided by the Roberts Court, the Court upheld the
Solomon Amendment against a constitutional challenge and, in so do-
ing, began its constitutional analysis by extolling the virtues of the mil-
itary deference doctrine when Congress legislates pursuant to its
constitutional power to raise and support armies:
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “provide
for the common Defence,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,”
and “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy.”  Congress’ power in
this area “is broad and sweeping,” and there is no dispute in
this case that it includes the authority to require campus ac-
cess for military recruiters.  That is, of course, unless Con-
gress exceeds constitutional limitations on its power in
enacting such legislation.  But the fact that legislation that
raises armies is subject to First Amendment constraints does
not mean that we ignore the purpose of this legislation when
determining its constitutionality; as we recognized in Rostker,
“judicial deference . . . is at its apogee” when Congress legis-
lates under its authority to raise and support armies.179
178. See id. at 309 (noting that Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733 (1974); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435
(1987); and Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994)).
179. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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While it is always dangerous to draw conclusions from a single
case, all participating members of the Court—Justice Alito did not
participate—joined Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, which invoked
the military deference doctrine as its first step in constitutional analy-
sis once the Court resolved what the statute in fact provided.180  More-
over, this is a case that could have been decided on a number of
grounds, such as a pure Spending Clause or First Amendment ba-
sis,181 without invoking the military deference doctrine, and the
Court’s prominent reliance on the military deference doctrine to sup-
port its decision suggests that there is no move afoot to eradicate the
doctrine, explicitly or through subtle narrowing.  For his part, Justice
Alito noted prominently in his confirmation hearing that he had
joined a conservative Princeton alumni group because, as an alumnus
who attended Princeton on an ROTC scholarship, he was unhappy
that the school had decided to abolish the campus ROTC program.182
While, again, predicting judicial attitudes based on personal history is
always a risky proposition, Justice Alito’s background makes him seem
like an unlikely candidate to take up the sword against the military
deference doctrine, particularly when every other member of the
Court joined an opinion applying it in FAIR.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is by no means an attempt to catalogue every military
deference case decided by the Court, or to discuss every nuance in its
application.183  It is important, however, that the doctrine be under-
stood, both in terms of the facts surrounding its development and the
limited scope of the doctrine as evidenced by the framework in which
it is applied.  Professor Lichtman’s article on the military deference
doctrine is thought provoking in that it challenges the orthodoxy by
which the military deference doctrine is viewed—through the lens of
time rather than through the lens of subject matter irrespective of
time.184  Ultimately, however, I have come to the conclusion that Pro-
fessor Lichtman’s analysis of the military deference doctrine is flawed
in several important respects, all of which result in a fundamental mis-
180. Id.
181. See id. at 1306–07 (addressing Spending Clause and unconstitutional conditions
arguments); id. at 1307–10 (addressing First Amendment arguments).
182. Maura Reynolds, Alito Is Sworn in as Next Supreme Court Justice, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2006.
183. For a considerably more exhaustive analysis that traces the development of the
Court’s military deference doctrine through three jurisprudential eras, see O’Connor,
supra note 8. R
184. Lichtman, supra note 1, at 910–11. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 39  9-MAY-07 9:53
706 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:668
understanding of the doctrine.  In my estimation, the principal flaws
in Professor Lichtman’s analysis include: focusing on “win-loss”
records rather than on the analytical framework in which those wins
and losses occurred; failing to perceive that the military deference
doctrine should—and does—apply only to a narrow category of “mili-
tary” cases; incorrectly casting the military deference doctrine as a
longstanding and relatively stable doctrine that has only subtly evolved
since the early twentieth century; determining that subject matter,
rather than timing, is the proper variable around which to organize
an analysis of military deference decisions; and concluding that the
military deference doctrine does not—and should not—apply to stat-
utes and regulations burdening civilians instead of military personnel.
The military deference doctrine is, at once, both historically im-
mature and limited, yet potent when applicable.  After the disruption
that occurred in the course of the Court’s prior rejection of the doc-
trine of noninterference, the Court ultimately landed on the military
deference doctrine as an appropriate analytical framework, where ap-
plicable, in the mid-1970s, and the Court has largely remained in the
same place with its military jurisprudence ever since.  The Court’s re-
jection of its noninterference policy beginning in the mid-1950s likely
came about as a result of what the Court perceived as overreaching by
the political branches in subjecting persons—military and civilian—to
courts-martial in a willy-nilly fashion.  If the military deference doc-
trine were to recede in importance in the future, it would be a good
bet that it happens because some collection of Supreme Court Justices
perceives that Congress and the President are overreaching in the ex-
ercise of their constitutional powers to raise armies and regulate the
armed forces.  At present, though, there is no sign that such an up-
heaval is anywhere on the horizon.
